Inequality indices (i) evaluate the divergence between the income distribution and the hypothetical situation where all individuals have the mean income and (ii) are unambiguously reduced by a Pigou-Dalton progressive transfer. This paper proposes a new approach to evaluate the divergence between any two income distributions, where the second one can be a reference distribution for the first. In the case where the reference distribution is perfectly egalitarian -and uniquely in this case -we assume (i) that any progressive transfer reduces the divergence and (ii) that the divergence can be additively separated between inequality and efficiency loss. We characterize the unique class of decomposable divergence measures consistent with these views, and we derive the associated relative (resp. absolute) subclasses, which express constant relative (resp. absolute) inequality aversion. This approach extends the generalized entropy studied in inequality measurement.
Introduction
The evaluation of an income distribution from a social welfare perspective requires a precise definition of the path which characterizes an unambiguous improvement of the welfare. If the total income is fixed, such an improvement is possible through an admissible redistribution mechanism of the income among the individuals. Nevertheless, the definition of the path towards a more acceptable distribution is far from being obvious. When the society consists of two individuals, identical in every way expect for their incomes, a progressive transfer of income from the richer to the poorer can reasonably be considered as a good candidate. But the situation is much more confused in the general case where the society consists of n > 2, possibly different individuals.
Following the so-called Pigou-Dalton principle of transfers, the cornerstone of the inequality measurement theory, any progressive transfer from an individual to one poorer than him -transfer that does not modify the respective positions on the income scale -always reduces the inequality. The principle of transfers is well-established: it is generally assumed that the notion of inequality itself can not be dissociated from this principle. However it is not immune to criticism, and not universally approved (Amiel and Cowell, 1992) . This fundamental question has been largely investigated in the literature, and two distinct issues have been identified. First, whereas the income inequality is unambiguously reduced among the individuals involved in a progressive transfer, it is not so obvious that the income inequality is also decreased in the whole society (Chateauneuf and Moyes, 2006) . Some combinations of progressive transfers can modify the distribution in a questionable direction, for example by an increase in the polarization (Esteban and Ray, 1994; Wolfson, 1994) . So one may argue that a progressive transfer does not always imply an improvement of the social welfare. Second, a perfectly equal income distribution -which constitutes the best outcome according to the principle of transfers -does not necessarily appear as reference point for the social planner. Some income inequality stemming from differences in personal responsibility, such as effort for example, may be view as fair. According to the responsibility-sensitive theory of justice (see Bossert, 1995; Bossert and Fleurbaey, 1996) , such inequality should not be compensated.
In this paper we consider that the acceptability of a progressive transfer depends on the actual income distribution, compared with the distribution the social planner wants to achieve. One possibility, among others, is to describe the social objective as a fair income distribution, compensating inequality for which individuals cannot be held responsible (for practical investigation methods, see Almas et al., 2007; Devooght, 2008) . This approach necessitates a reconsideration of the principle of transfers. For example, consider that the actual distribution corresponds exactly to the distribution wanted by the social planner. Then any progressive transfer will widen the distribution from the social objective: in that case, only the statu quo is acceptable. We assume in this paper that a progressive transfer is always an admissible path to get closer to an egalitarian distribution, characterized by the mean income for all the individuals. But we also assume that the effect of such a transfer may be ambiguous if the reference distribution is not egalitarian. Thus, in our framework, the shape of the objective distribution is a relevant feature in order to evaluate a progressive transfer.
The aim of this paper is to characterize measures which evaluate the divergence between any two income distributions of the same size, integrating the normative judgments described above. The properties we impose on the measures explicitly identify one distribution as the initial distribution (denoted by x) and the other as a representative, reference or objective distribution for the first (denoted by y). As it will be clarified later, we emphasize that we are focus on divergence measures, which are not metrics, in opposition to distance measures. We impose two fundamental properties and we identify the unique class of decomposable divergence measures consistent with these views. First we impose the version of the principle of transfers described above, which considers that a progressive transfers reduces the inequality, only if the objective distribution is the mean income for all. Then we assume that, if the reference distribution is egalitarian -an income c for all -the divergence measures can be additively decomposed into two components. The first component evaluates the inequality within the distribution x, or equivalently the divergence between x and the hypothetical situation where all individuals have the mean. The second component evaluates the efficiency loss, due to the divergence between the hypothetical situation where all individuals have the mean and the reference distribution characterized by the income c for all. This property is called judgment separability. Traditional inequality indices can be replaced in this context: as already mentioned, an inequality index implicitly evaluates the divergence between the income distribution under consideration and the hypothetical situation where all individuals have the mean income. We show that our divergence measures extend the usual decomposable families of inequality indices: under some restrictive conditions, they come down to the relative and absolute versions of the generalized entropy initiated by Cowell (1980) , Cowell and Kuga (1981) and Shorrocks (1980 Shorrocks ( , 1984 .
The evaluation of the divergence between any two income distributions is not really new in the literature. Cowell (1985) characterizes a large class of divergence measures, called measures of distributional change. Nevertheless our approach is conceptually different, on two main features: (i) on the properties required for the measures and (ii) on the measures obtained. (i) Since divergence measures generalize inequality indices, Cowell (1985) proposes to generalize the principle of transfers, a property called monotonicity in distance. Whereas it represents an appropriate extension of the principle of transfers in a more general framework, this property is quite demanding. The property we impose, called simply principle of transfers, is weaker. Then the measures identified by Cowell (1985) are not consistent with the other main property we assume, called judgment separability.
(ii) The divergence measures obtained by Cowell (1985) and the divergence measures characterized in the present paper are different. The more surprising is that both classes of measures are well-known in information theory, and are precisely the most largely used. The relative measures identified by Cowell (1985) are Csiszár f -divergences, independently introduced by Csiszár (1963) and Ali and Silvey (1966) , and the measures we propose are Bregman divergences, introduced by Bregman (1967) . A well-known result in information theory is that Csiszár f -divergences and Bregman divergences are distinct, but coincide on one specific case: this divergence -which is unique, not a subclass -is called Kullback-Leibler divergence and has been introduced by Kullback and Leibler (1951) . Also, Cowell (1985) characterized a class of absolute measures. There exists only one divergence at the intersection with our class of measures, which is called squared euclidean distance, a generalization of the variance.
The paper is organized as follows. We present in Section 2 our conceptual framework and we introduce the main properties, namely smoothness, judgment separability, anonymity and the principle of transfers, which will be imposed on all the divergence measures. We isolate a class of measures compatible with them. It is characterized by only one evaluation function, and the consistency with the principle of transfers, combined with the anonymity requirement, is captured by the strict Schur-convexity of this function. Then we focus on decomposable mea-sures, consistent with a non-negativity requirement. The implication is an additive structure for the measures. The entire class of measures, compatible with all the properties, is identified. Note that the divergence measures we obtain attain the minimal value 0 if and only if the first distribution is exactly equivalent to the reference distribution, and are strictly positive otherwise. Section 3 is concerned with the definition of the inequality aversion, where we distinguish the relative and absolute versions. The subclass exhibiting a constant relative inequality aversion is isolated, introducing a measure of relative inequality aversion similar to the one proposed by Pratt (1964) in risk theory. The only admissible measures are homogeneous of some degree, which implies a one-parameter structure on the evaluation function. Then the alternative class of measures which exhibit a constant absolute inequality aversion is identified. Admissible measures appear to be translatable of some degree, with a comparable implication on the evaluation function. We introduce normalized classes of measures in Section 4. We expose several normalization strategies to let the measures invariant to uniform modifications of all incomes, or identical duplications of the population. For example we analyze the implications of the principle of populations and the scale invariance or the translation invariance. Section 5 is devoted to a discussion of the relationship between our approach and the standard literature. First we restrict attention to the particular case where the reference distribution is the mean income for all the individuals. In that case a divergence measure is nothing else but a standard inequality index. We observe that our divergence measures extend the usual generalized relative and absolute entropy measures. Then we compare our approach to the divergence measures proposed by Cowell (1985) . Finally we summarize our main results in Section 6, which also hints at some directions for future research.
A general class of decomposable divergence measures

Notation
We consider a population N : ={1, 2, . . . , n} consisting of n ≥ 1 individuals. An income distribution for population N is a list x : =(x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n ), where x i ∈ D is the income of individual i ∈ N , and D is a compact subset of the real line R. Given a distribution x ∈ D n , the sum of the incomes is indicated by θ(x) : = n i=1 x i and the mean income by µ(x) : = θ(x)/n. We will write µ(x) or sometimes µ the mean of x if no ambiguity arises. We denote the reduced distribution of x ∈ D n asx : =(x 1 ,x 2 , . . . ,x n ) and the centered distribution asx : =(x 1 ,x 2 , . . . ,x n ), where respectivelyx i : = x i /µ andx i : = x i − µ for all i ∈ N . We let 1 n : =(1, . . . , 1) and 0 n : =(0, . . . , 0) represent respectively the unit vector and the null vector in R n . In this paper a measure The requirement of a common size for both distributions can be perceived as a severe restriction to make a divergence measure applicable in practice, since it is unusual to observe two empirical distributions with such a common characteristic -unless one distribution is explicitly constructed from the other. Nevertheless empirical distributions are traditionally divided in quantiles, and each quantile is represented by the mean income within the quantile. Then the empirical distributions are replaced by the distributions of quantile means, and the common size of the distributions corresponds to the fixed number of such points.
assumptions: (i) non-negativity, such that d n (x, y) ≥ 0 and the equality holds if and only if
n ) constitutes a metric space. The notion of economic distance, or directed distance, has been largely investigated in the inequality literature (Shorrocks, 1982; Ebert, 1984; Cowell, 1985) . In most cases, a divergence function only satisfies assumption (i), and is asymmetric: for this reason a divergence function between distributions x, y ∈ D n will be indicated by D n (x y). Asymmetry corresponds to D n (x y) = D n (y x). We emphasize that no assumptions are imposed at this stage on the function D n in our framework.
In this paper, y is considered as a representative, reference or objective distribution of x, from which this last distribution is compared. Traditional inequality indices can be placed in this framework, letting the reference distribution explicit. For example Shorrocks (1980) , Theorem 1 page 617, characterizes a normalized version of the following additive divergence:
where the reference distribution is the mean income of x for all the individuals, and φ : D −→ R is a strictly convex function. The author then deduces, by an appropriate normalization, a large family of inequality indices called in this paper generalized relative entropy. If the population can be partitioned into disjoint subgroups, the reference income of a subgroup becomes the subgroup mean. The mean income for all as reference distribution is not the only possibility. Other reference distributions have been studied in the literature, with the common characteristic to define a unique reference income for all the individuals within the population (or the subgroup). For example Blackorby et al. (1981) argue that the subgroup mean has to be replaced by the equally-distributed-equivalent income of the subgroup, and Foster and Shneyerov (1999, 2000) justify the use of the q-order mean. We propose in this paper to weaken this view: we let flexible the choice of the reference distribution, so that each individual can have his own reference income.
Main axioms and their implications
We characterize a large class of divergence measures, by extending the usual framework of the inequality measurement theory. The main feature of our approach is to let y be the reference distribution of x in the majority of the properties required for the measures.
) is continuous and has continuous first-order partial derivatives.
It corresponds to a regularity condition which implies that small changes in the distributions x or y result in small changes in the divergence. We assume the differentiability of D n , essentially by mathematical convenience. This condition could be weakened, but at the cost of openness in the characterization. Note that the differentiability is not useful until Theorem 1.
Property 2 (Judgment Separability) For all x ∈ D
n and all c ∈ D, we have:
Judgment Separability is without any doubt the key, and quite new property of the paper. Suppose that the reference distribution y ∈ D n is a social objective, equally distributed among the individuals such that y i = c for all i ∈ N . This property supposes that the divergence between the actual distribution x and the reference distribution c1 n is additively separable into two components. The first component evaluates the inequality within the distribution x, which corresponds to the divergence between x and the hypothetical situation where all individuals have the mean income µ. The second component evaluates the efficiency loss which results from the divergence between the mean income µ and the social objective c. Precisely, the second component measures the divergence between the hypothetical situation where all individuals have µ and the hypothetical situation where all individuals have c. It is interesting to note that, from (2.2), we have
Hence, if the reference distribution is the mean income of the actual distribution x for all, or equivalently y = µ1 n , then property 2 becomes trivial since it implies that we are only concerned by the inequality dimension, evaluated by D n (x µ1 n ).
We complete the framework by incorporating two standard assumptions in normative economics, in order to define the preference for equality.
Property 3 (Anonymity)
For all x, y ∈ D n and all n × n permutation matrix Π, we have
Anonymity supposes that the evaluation of the divergence between the actual distribution x and the reference distribution y is not affected by a permutation of the identity of the individuals. Note that a measure D n , consistent with property 3, is invariant to a simultaneous and identical permutation for both distributions x and y. A stronger version of this property -which does not make sense in our framework -should be to require that D n (xΠ yΠ ) = D n (x y) for two, possibly different, n × n permutation matrices Π and Π . Hence the measures identified in the present paper are admissible as measures of income mobility (see Fields and Ok, 1996) . Then, it is typically assumed that inequality is reduced by a transfer of income from a richer to a poorer individual. Precisely, given two distributions x, x ∈ D n , we will say that x is obtained from x by means of a progressive transfer if there exist an income amount ∆ > 0 and two individuals h, k ∈ N such that:
By analogy with the inequality literature, we assume that a progressive transfer unambiguously reduces the divergence between x and the reference distribution, whenever this last distribution is the mean income of x for all the individuals, but uniquely in this case.
Property 4 (Principle of Transfers) For all x, x ∈ D n , if x is obtained from x by means of a progressive transfer, then we have
Note that the notion of progressive transfer does not make sense in the general situation where the reference distribution is not egalitarian. Precisely our definition of the principle of transfers does not require that for all x, y ∈ D n , if x is obtained from x by means of a progressive transfer, then D n (x y) > D n (x y). We say that a function φ n : D n −→ R is strictly Schur-convex if for all distributions x ∈ D n and a n × n bistochastic matrix B, we have φ n (x) > φ n (xB) if B is not a permutation matrix, and φ n (x) = φ n (xB) otherwise (see Marshall and Olkin, 1979) . If we add anonymity and the principle of transfers to properties 1 and 2 we obtain the following proposition, which echoes usual results in normative economics. 
By the Schur-convexity of φ n , one remarks that D n (x µ1 n ) ≥ 0 for all x ∈ D n . Hence we have isolated an extended class of entropy measures, possibly non-additive, which admit as special case the measure presented in (2.1) and proposed by Shorrocks (1980 Shorrocks ( , 1984 . This extension, certainly the only admissible, looks convincing by analogy with the measurement of social welfare: the well-known utilitarian model, with a strictly concave utility function, is an additive subclass of the general family of the strictly Schur-concave social welfare functions.
We assume that the measure D 1 is non-negative. One remarks that, from property 2, we already know that D 1 (c c ) = 0 whenever c = c . In this paper, we only focus on decomposable measures. Assume that the whole population N can be decomposed into g subgroups N g consisting of n g individuals each. Precisely, we let P : ={N 1 , N 2 , . . . , N g } represents a disjoint an exhaustive partition of N . The income distribution of subgroup g is denoted by
). We define the following property, introduced by Fields and Ok (1996) : Property 6 (Decomposability) For all x, y ∈ D n where n ≥ 2 and a disjoint and exhaustive partition P : ={N 1 , N 2 } of N , we have:
where
It is not required that the function F n is strictly increasing in its arguments: this is a consequence of the consistency with the principle of transfers and the non-negativity assumption, as observed in the following result. We deduce that for all distributions x, y ∈ D n , under properties 1 to 6, D n (x y) ≥ 0 and the equality holds if and only if x = y. Thus D n attains its minimal value if the distribution x under consideration is exactly equal to the reference distribution y. The following result demonstrates that under property 6, the measure D n has an additive structure.
Proposition 2.3 If a measure
Decomposability does not represent a really demanding aggregation rule, but it automatically excludes non-separable measures such that the class of rank-dependent inequality indices, for example the Gini index. Nevertheless the class of decomposable divergence measures is sufficiently large to encompass a majority of inequality indices, such that the generalized relative and absolute entropies, or the Atkinson-Kolm-Sen and Kolm-Pollak families of normative indices.
We now present the central result of this paper, assuming that properties 1 and 6 are rational for a divergence measure. In the following, a measure D n φ refers to a measure characterized by Theorem 1.
Theorem 1 A measure D n satisfies properties 1 to 6 if and only if
for all x, y ∈ D n , and φ : D −→ R is a twice differentiable and strictly convex function.
The measure D n φ is not really new: it is well-known and largely used in information theory, and is called Bregman divergence (Bregman, 1967 ). An alternative characterization is proposed by Banerjee et al. (2005) in information theory.
We have proposed in this subsection an intuitive and relatively undemanding extension of standard inequality measures, which can be written in the form (2.1), such that the generalized relative and absolute entropies. The only new and debatable requirement is the property 2, namely judgement separability. First, we recall that this property becomes trivial in the inequality measurement framework, when the reference distribution is µ1 n . Then, note that judgment separability makes sense in terms of decomposability of the divergence measure. Assume that the whole population N can be partitioned into g disjoint subgroups N g . From judgment separability (property 2), we have D
ng ) for all g = 1, 2, . . . , g and, using decomposability (property 6), we have: 6) or equivalently:
Equations (2.6) and (2.7) ensure that the divergence between the initial situation x and the situation where all the individuals have the income c, can be expressed as the sum of (i) a within-subgroup component which measures the divergence, within all the subgroups, between the incomes and the subgroup mean, and (ii) a between-subgroup component which computes the divergence between the hypothetical situation where all the individuals into the subgroup have the subgroup mean, and the hypothetical situation where all the individuals have the income c. Consequently, the traditional additive decomposability condition (Bourguignon, 1979; Shorrocks, 1980) used in inequality measurement, in its unweighed form, appears to be the conjunction of judgment separability and decomposability in our framework, as presented in equations (2.6) and (2.7).
Characterization with constant inequality aversion
In the previous Section, we have identified a large class of divergence measures denoted by D φ , where the inequality aversion is captured by the strict convexity of the function φ. We propose in this Section to define the admissible subclass of divergence measures which express a constant relative inequality aversion, and the alternative subclass which express a constant absolute inequality aversion.
Inequality aversion evaluation
Strict convexity of φ signifies that the social planner is inequality averse, in the sense of the principle of transfers. Consequently it would be interesting to find a measure which evaluates the degree of inequality aversion. Suppose that x, x ∈ D n and that x is obtained from x by means of a progressive transfer from individual k to h, as described in (2.3). Moreover,
n ) > 0 with φ strictly convex, is equivalent to:
Since φ > 0 and ∆ > 0, inequality (3.1) says that the positive impact of φ(
is proportionally more important than the negative impact of φ(x h ) − φ(x h + ∆). At the limit, the left hand of (3.1) is equal to 1 and a progressive transfer has no impact on the divergence, such that D n φ (x µ1 n ) − D n φ (x µ1 n ) = 0. Consequently we may argue that the greater the left hand of (3.1), the stronger the inequality aversion. But we need to be careful about the first derivative of φ, since there exist no intuitive reasons, at this stage, to impose positivity or negativity. One remarks that D n φ (x µ1 n ) − D n φ (x µ1 n ) > 0 with φ strictly convex is also equivalent to:
Here the interpretation is reversed: if φ < 0, then the lower the left hand of (3.2), the stronger the inequality aversion. But we insist on the fact that the sign of φ has no incidence on the consistency with the principle of transfers: it is ensured by the strict convexity of φ, or equivalently by φ > 0.
Using the approach developed by Pratt (1964) , the degree of inequality aversion of the social planner is captured by the degree of convexity of φ: the more the convexity of the function φ, the more the inequality aversion of the social planner. It is common pratice to distinguish relative aversion and absolute aversion. The measure of relative inequality aversion, denoted by ρ φ , is defined by:
3)
The following result establishes the link between the degree of relative inequality aversion and the degree of convexity of φ. The proof follows immediately from Pratt (1964) 
The measure of relative inequality aversion can be substituted by the alternative measure of absolute inequality aversion, denoted by α φ , and defined by:
A result equivalent to Proposition 3.1 can be obtained, replacing ρ φ (c) by α φ (c) in statement (i) and letting D ⊆ R.
Homogeneous and translatable divergence measures
If the relative inequality aversion evaluated by ρ φ (c) is constant for all c ∈ D, then a particular form is imposed on the divergence measures. We will show that a necessary and sufficient condition amounts to requiring that the measures are homogeneous. First we introduce the notion of homogeneity of some degree r ∈ R.
Property 7 (Homogeneity of degree r) For all
We start by characterizing the admissible class of measures which are consistent with properties 1 to 6, and which are homogeneous of degree r ∈ R. We obtain a one-parameter class of measures, where the parameter corresponds to the degree of homogeneity of D n .
Theorem 2 A measure D n satisfies properties 1 to 6 and 7 if and only if
, and for all c ∈ D: The function φ r is quite familiar in the inequality measurement literature: it corresponds to the function associated to the generalized relative entropy, as demonstrated by Shorrocks (1980) . Hence Theorem 2 provides a clear interpretation of the unique parameter of this index, establishing the connection with the degree of homogeneity of the underlying divergence measure. We go a step further: homogeneity appears to be a sufficient and necessary condition to express constant relative inequality aversion, as presented in the following result. 
Hence the parameter r of the function φ r represents the degree of homogeneity of the function, but also the degree of relative inequality aversion it captures, constant over D. Suppose that the function φ r is strictly increasing, which is equivalent to let r ≥ 1. We deduce that a social planner with relative inequality aversion r 1 is more averse than another with relative inequality aversion r 2 , or equivalently ρ r 1 (c) > ρ r 2 (c), if and only if r 1 > r 2 . But if φ r is strictly decreasing, which corresponds to r < 1, we have ρ r 1 (c) > ρ r 2 (c) if and only if r 1 < r 2 .
Constant relative inequality aversion is not the only possibility. The social planner can alternatively express constant absolute inequality aversion, or equivalently a constant α φ . Now a necessary and sufficient condition is that the divergence measure is translatable. We have to introduce the notion of translatability of some degree a ∈ R.
Property 8 (Translatability of degree a) For all x, y ∈ D
n , all λ ∈ R and all a ∈ R, we have
The definition we propose is slightly different from the standard one encountered in the inequality literature (see for example Blackorby and Donaldson, 1980) . We know that D n φ (x y) with φ strictly convex is strictly positive if there exists an individual i ∈ N such that x i = y i . In that case, translatability of degree a is equivalent to:
The following result characterizes the admissible subclass of measures D n φ , translatable of some degree a ∈ R.
Theorem 3 A measure D n satisfies properties 1 to 6 and 8 if and only if
n , and for all c ∈ D: The function φ a corresponds to the function underlying the absolute counterpart of the generalized relative entropy, called in this paper generalized absolute entropy, studied by Chakravarty and Tyagarupananda (1998) and Bosmans and Cowell (2009) . After substitution of φ a into D n a , we remark that the linear components B and C vanish. Hence the divergence measure D n a is simply defined up to a scale transformation (A > 0). With a ∈ R, this measure can be written as:
When a = 0, D n a corresponds to the well-known squared euclidean distance, with the characteristic to be symmetric and homogeneous of degree 2. When a = 0 there does not exist, to the best of our knowledge, a similar family of divergence measures in information theory. The following result establishes the connection between the degree of translatability of a measure D n and the degree of absolute inequality aversion, and shows that translatability is a necessary and sufficient condition to have a constant aversion. 
The interpretation of the parameter a is similar to parameter r. Suppose that the function φ a is strictly increasing, which is equivalent to have a ≥ 1. We deduce that a social planner with absolute inequality aversion a 1 is more averse than another with absolute inequality aversion a 2 , or equivalently α a 1 (c) > α a 2 (c), if and only if a 1 > a 2 . But if φ a is strictly decreasing, which corresponds to a < 1, we have α a 1 (c) > α a 2 (c) if and only if a 1 < a 2 .
Normalized divergence measures
The divergence measures characterized until now propose to evaluate the shape of an income distribution x ∈ D n , in comparison with the shape of a reference distribution y ∈ D n . Two large classes emerge: the class of measures with constant relative inequality aversion and the alternative class with constant absolute inequality aversion. These measures are based on a particular definition of the distribution shape: it corresponds to the graphical representation of the distribution where the real incomes (in abscissae) are associated to the number of individuals having these incomes (in ordinate). Thus an uniform modification of all incomes or an identical duplication of the population will immediately modify the distribution shape. But the notion of shape can be apprehended in different ways. We will present in this section two possible approaches, which lead to classes of normalized divergence measures.
Standard invariance properties
Traditionally, it is considered that an uniform modification of all incomes or an identical duplication of the population do not impact the shape of the distribution. For these purposes we introduce, for all x, y ∈ D n , the following family of measures:
where F is a function strictly increasing in its first argument, recalling that θ(x) = nµ(x). In the following we assume that the measure D n satisfies properties 1 to 6, but neither Homogeneity nor Translatability of some degree. The measure I is then characterized assuming standard invariance properties. This property is useful if we assume that the shape of the distribution can not depend on the number of individuals, but on the proportion of individuals having particular incomes. We can also consider that a uniform scale transformation of all incomes does not impact the measure I.
Property 10 (Scale Invariance)
For all x, y ∈ D n (D ⊆ R ++ ) and all λ ∈ R ++ , we have I(λx λy) = I(x y).
We precise that property 10 does not require that a unilateral modification, of distribution x or distribution y, has no impact on I. For example if we assume that the reference distribution is not y but becomes λy where λ ∈ R ++ , x remaining fixed, we should anticipate a modification of the measure I. Theorem 4 below presents the complete class of measures I consistent with scale invariance and the principle of populations. 
such that F is a strictly increasing function. D n r is homogeneous of degree r ∈ R, and defined in (3.6).
As we have already insisted, we do not assume in Theorem 4 that D n is homogeneous of some degree. However, Theorem 4 shows that homogeneity of D n is a necessary condition to keep I consistent with the scale invariance condition. The obtained class of measures (I r ) r∈R is a normalized version of the class of homogeneous measures characterized by Theorem 2. More importantly, the degree of relative inequality aversion of I r , denoted by r and constant on D, corresponds to the degree of homogeneity of the underlying measure D n r . We also remark that D n r is deflated by the size of the distributions, which guarantees that I r is invariant to population replications.
A scale invariant measure I is by definition invariant to a simultaneous and common modification of the means of distributions x, y ∈ D n . But other views exist in the literature. The main alternative is to consider that the add of a positive or negative amount, common to all incomes, does not impact I.
Property 11 (Translation Invariance)
For all x, y ∈ D n and all λ ∈ R, we have I(x + λ1 n y + λ1 n ) = I(x y).
Once again, we have to be careful about the interpretation of translation invariance. This property does not require that a unilateral modification, of distribution x or distribution y, has no impact on I. The entire class of measures I consistent with translation invariance and the principle of populations is presented in the result below. 
such that F is a strictly increasing function. D n a is translatable of degree a ∈ R, and defined in (3.10).
Theorem 5 demonstrates that we have now to accept the translatability of D n if we require that I satisfies translation invariance. The class of measures (I a ) a∈R appears to be a normalized version of the class of translatable measures characterized by Theorem 3. Moreover, the degree of absolute inequality aversion of I a , denoted by a and constant on D, corresponds to the degree of translatability of the underlying measure D n a . We conclude this part by an investigation dealing with the decomposability of the measures I r and I a , respectively characterized in Theorems 4 and 5. Suppose that, for both measures I r and I a , the function F is the identity function F (t) = t. In that case we obtain respectively µ(x) for all x, y ∈ D n (D ⊆ R ++ for the relative measures), and r, a ∈ R. We know that a divergence measure D n φ (Theorem 1) can be written as in equation (2.6). Thus, if the reference distribution y is the same income c ∈ D for all, we immediately deduce that:
nµ r I r (µ g c) .
(4.4)
A relative measure I r is decomposable into a within-subgroup component and a betweensubgroup component. But the subgroups are now weighted, and the weights are precisely the same as the ones observed in the generalized relative entropy. Equivalently, we have:
n e a µ I a (µ g c) .
(4.5)
The decomposition of an absolute measure I a is similar, but with different weights. These weights are also well-known in inequality measurement, and are the ones of the generalized absolute entropy (see Chakravarty and Tyagarupananda, 1998) .
Strong invariance properties
Measures I r or I a are interesting since the are invariant to uniform -scale or translationtransformations of both distributions x and y, simultaneously. But as mentioned before, a scale invariant or translation invariant measure is not invariant to unilateral transformations. Suppose for example that the reference distribution y is an objective to achieve, such that y is unambiguously more equally distributed and with a higher mean than the actual distribution x. Then it is obvious that I r (x λy) > I r (x y) with λ > 1, and I a (x y + λ1 n ) > I a (x y) with λ > 0. In other words, a measure I is still concerned with the mean of the distributions x and y. But the social planner can be interested by the shape of the distributions, and not concerned by their positions. In other words, one can propose normalized divergence measures that are invariant to unilateral modification of the mean. To do so, we will see that we have to directly normalize the distributions. For all x, y ∈ D n , we introduced the following class of measures:
where F is a function strictly increasing in its first argument. We first propose to strengthen the traditional scale invariance property, introducing strong scale invariance.
Property 12 (Strong Scale Invariance)
For all x, y ∈ D n (D ⊆ R ++ ) and all λ, β ∈ R ++ , we have J(λx βy) = J(x y).
First note that strong scale invariance implies scale invariance, but the converse is false. Assuming this new property amounts to requiring that the shape of the distribution does not depend on the incomes but on the incomes deflated by the mean, equivalently the income shares, as described in the following result. For a distribution z ∈ D n , we recall thatẑ represents the corresponding distribution of income shares. 
The distribution shape corresponds now to the graphical representation of the distribution where the income share (in abscissae) is associated to the proportion of individuals having this income share (in ordinate). An alternative way is to strengthen the property of translation invariance.
Property 13 (Strong Translation Invariance)
For all x, y ∈ D n and all λ, β ∈ R, we have J(x + λ1 n y + β1 n ) = J(x y).
Similarly, strong translation invariance implies translation invariance but the converse is false. This alternative property implies that the shape of the distribution does not depend on the incomes but on the incomes reduced by the mean, or equivalently the -positive or negativedistances from the incomes to the mean of the distribution. For a distribution z ∈ D n , we recall thatz represents the corresponding distribution of reduced incomes. The proof is similar to the previous Theorem and is omitted.
Theorem 7 Let D
n satisfying properties 1 to 6. A measure J satisfies properties 9 and 13 if and only if J ≡ J a , where for all x, y ∈ D n :
Now the shape of a distribution corresponds to the graphical representation of the distribution where the reduced income (in abscissae) is associated to the proportion of individuals having these reduced income (in ordinate).
The comparison of the shape of a distribution x to the shape of a reference distribution y can be useful in empirical exercises where we have to estimate an appropriate functional form for a real distribution. In this framework, x is the distribution obtained from the real-world data and y is the estimated distribution. Cowell et al. (2009) propose a one-parameter divergence measure between x and y, and argue that it can be used as a goodness-of-fit measure. Our class (J r ) r∈R can play the same role.
Relationship with the literature
From divergences to inequality indices
A immediate application of the measures characterized in this paper is to consider that the reference distribution is equally distributed for all the individuals, for example the mean income for all. A divergence measure becomes in this context a traditional inequality index: the more distant the actual income distribution from the situation where all the individuals have the mean income, the larger the divergence. Additive inequality indices usually studied in the empirical and theoretical literature belong to the classes of divergence measures I(x y) characterized in subsection 4.1, where the reference distribution is the mean income of x for all, denoted µ. We know from Theorem 1 that a divergence measure D n (x µ1 n ) satisfies properties 1 to 6 if and only if D n ≡ D where φ is a strictly convex function. A normalized version of this class can be found in Shorrocks (1980 Shorrocks ( , 1984 . This class was independently introduced in information theory by Burbea and Rao (1982) , and is called Burbea-Rao divergences. Due to the anteriority of the Shorrocks' paper, the appellation Shorrocks-Burbea-Rao divergences seems to be more convenient.
distribution is egalitarian. This class, also called Bregman divergences, is well-known in information theory. Then we have identified the entire class of measures which exhibit constant relative inequality aversion. This class extends the well-known family of generalized relative entropy measures introduced by Cowell (1980) , Cowell and Kuga (1981) and Shorrocks (1980 Shorrocks ( , 1984 . The absolute counterpart of this class is also studied. The evaluation of the divergence between two distributions requires a precise definition of what the shape of a distribution means. Several normalization strategies have been introduced, depending on the possible conceptions of the distribution shape that can be imagined.
The attractiveness of the approach developed in this paper lies in the fact that the divergence measures extend, quite intuitively, traditional inequality measures letting the reference distribution flexible. A divergence measure is an inequality measure when the reference distribution is egalitarian. In the general case, a divergence measure is able to capture some features of the distributions the inequality measures failed to identify. The comparison of two flexible income distributions is not new in the literature. The uniqueness of our approach is to defined, explicitly in the axiomatization, one distribution as the reference from which the actual distribution is compared. The cornerstone of our axiomatization is the property called judgment separability, property which becomes trivial if the reference distribution is equally distributed. It is not satisfied by the existing characterizations. Hence our approach leads to different divergence measures.
Nevertheless some questions remain open. First the paper is exclusively focused on decomposable divergence measures. Consequently all the additive inequality indices -generalized entropies, Atkinson-Kolm-Sen and Kolm-Pollak families of indices -belong to the general class characterized here, but we automatically exclude non-additive measures such that the class of rank-dependent inequality indices, for example the Gini index. An extension of this work might weaken the decomposability requirement, by imposing for example a rank-sensitive independence of the irrelevant incomes property. Another important issue deals with the connections existing between our divergence measures and the measures proposed by Cowell (1985) . It would be interesting to identify, axiomatically, the real differences between these approaches. These questions might be the object of future investigations.
